One mistake is to assume that {the first} is a "mystery" that is
unknowable. For example, {the first} is a powerful being beyond our
comprehension, or a reality in another invisible realm of existence. But
to say that {the first} is unknowable like this is still to assume that
it could have some characteristics - it is just that we are not capable
of knowing those characteristics. If someone wishes to claim that
something with characteristics - albeit "mysterious" characteristics
that we can't know - can be {the first}, then that is an utterly
unrelated inquiry. The insight here is that such a thing could not be
"first".
Since {the first} has no characteristics to know, it may seem like
there could be no knowledge relevant to this inquiry. But the statement
"if it has characteristics then it is not {the first}" is knowledge,
and this statement is unique to {the first}. Therefore, knowing that
anything with characteristics is not {the first} is the way inquiry
proceeds. But how could that knowledge be useful? It is useful for
revealing deep-rooted mistakes that come from trying to give {the
first} some characteristic. Such mistakes are in very basic
assumptions which will be investigated here.
The sense of one's immediate experience depends on implicit
assumptions. For example, the sense of the immediate experience of
sitting calmly in a chair entails the assumption that there is no
immediate danger. If it is assumed that there is immediate danger, the
sense of the situation would be different and it wouldn't be the
experience of sitting calmly. More importantly, the basic sense of
one's own identity and the sense of how one exists through time are
based on assumptions about the nature of being. (If this isn't obvious,
nothing more will be said here to try to explain it.)
Mistakes come from trying to substitute something else (with
characteristics) for {the first}. And it is the case that discovering
mistaken assumptions about the nature of being changes the sense of
one's immediate experience. But it is not the case that creating a
new experience of being is the purpose of fundamental inquiry. And it
is certainly not the case that some new experience, however profound, is
the "experience of {the first}" or {the first} itself. Any such
experience has some characteristic flavor, and so has characteristics,
and so cannot be {the first}. How quickly another attempt to substitute
something else for {the first} creeps back in!
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